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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
LABOR LAW-USE OF THE INJUNCTION IN
LABOR DISPUTES IN KENTUCKY
The injunction has long been recognized as the most important
and effective means by which employers have been able to regulate
and curtail labor activities. Unfortunately, it is still true that, "The
development of the law in respect to labor disputes and the use of in-
junctive processes has become rather complex."1 However, a consistent
public policy in regard to labor activities is discernible in the decisions
of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. It is the purpose of this note to
discuss the basis and implications of this policy as reflected by its
application to various factual situations, and to delineate the area
within which the State is not excluded from acting because of federal
pre-emption in the field.
The basis of the Kentucky law governing labor activities is readily
traced to nineteenth century concepts of free competition, a concept
expressed by Holmes in his famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner:
It has been the law for centuries that a man may set up
a business in a small country town, too small to support more than
one, although thereby he expects and intends to ruin some one
already there, and succeeds in his intent. . . . The reason, of course,
is that the doctrine generally has been accepted that free competition
is worth more to society than it costs, and that on this ground the
infliction of the damage is privileged ...
[T]he policy of allowing free competition justifies the intentional in-
fiction of temporal damages, including the damage of interference
with a man's business by some means, when the damage is done, not
for its own sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of
victory in the battle of trade. .... 2
Although this concept of economic self-interest as justification for the
actions of capital was applied most freely, many American courts ap-
plied a different standard when judging labor activities. The courts
felt free to determine for themselves whether a certain labor objective
constituted justification, and more often than not, the particular labor
activity was held not to be justified.3 This, Holmes felt, was neither a
fair nor proper application of the concept of competition as justifica-
tion:
1 Music Hall Theater v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 249 Ky. 689 at
642, 61 S.W. 2d 283 at 284 (1933).
2 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 at 1080-81 (1896).
3 Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 52-104 (1949); Felix Frankfurter
and Nathan Greene, The Use of the Injunction in American Labor Controversies,
44 L.Q. Rev. 164 at 181-97 (1928).
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I have seen the suggestion made that the conflict between
employers and employed was not competition. . . If the policy on
which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term 'free
competition,' we may substitute 'free struggle for life.' Certainly, the
policy is not limited to the struggles between persons of the same
class, competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of
temporal interests.
Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination
on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle
is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.
If it be true that working-men may combine with a view
.. to getting as much as they can for their labor, just as capital may
combine with a view of getting the greatest possible return, it must
be true that, when combined, they have the same liberty that com-
bined capital has, to support their interests by argument, persuasion,
and the bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they other-
wise lawfully control . . . The fact that the immediate object of the
act by which the benefit to themselves is to be gained is to injure
their antagonist does not necessarily make it unlawful, any more than
when a great house lowers the prices of goods for the purpose and
with the effect of driving a smaller antagonist from the business. 4
Under this doctrine, injury to business resulting from labor activities
was justified by economic self-interest so long as the means used in
conducting the activity were not unlawful.
Labor's right to organize to secure higher wages, shorter hours,
and improved conditions of employment was recognized very early in
Kentucky,0 although it has been said that all labor activity was prima
facie a tort under the common law.7 An examination of the Kentucky
decisions clearly shows that the Holmes concept of competition as
justification has been the basis from which the Court of Appeals has
judged various labor activities. The court acknowledged that a business
man, singly or in combination with others, could engage in a course
of conduct which would necessarily injure another, but which would
be justified by his economic interests.8 Moreover, Kentucky did not
apply a double standard to business and labor activity. The court
stated:
A man's labor is his own, and he has a right to dispose
of it upon the best terms he can secure. .. . The exercise of a legal
right by one in a proper manner will not be denied, although damage
4 Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra note 2, 44 N.E. at 1081-82.
5 For a historical development of this doctrine in America, see Gregory, supra
note :3 at 52-82.
6 Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018
(1912); Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S.W.
1079 (1920).
7 Blue Boar Cafeteria v. Hotel & Restaurant & Bartenders International, 254
S.W. 2d 335 at 337 (Ky. 1953).
8 Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra note 6 at 490,
222 S.W. 1084.
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or loss may result to another as a necessary consequence thereof. ...
If the same principle applies to a union, which is but an organization
of men for mutual benefit and protection, the plaintiff is remediless,
even though his business is ruined.9
Since business men could join together to make themselves stronger
and their profits greater, laborers could unite for the same purpose;
"What capital may lawfully do, labor may do with equal right."' 0 It
is not surprising that this concept has led us to refer to employer-
employee struggles as 'industrial warfare' and to the use of such
military terms as 'picketing.' Although this approach to the problem
is not totally acceptable in mid-twentieth century, it still remains that
so long as the purpose of a particular activity is "to promote the
legitimate interests of the participants, and means employed are not
unlawful, the party injured thereby is without remedy."11
An action at law exists as a remedy for injuries which are the result
of illegal labor conduct, but the injunction is clearly the most popular
remedy of the employer. Since labor unions were usually voluntary
associations, it was originally very difficult to secure a judgment
against a union, and individual workmen were seldom in a financial
position to respond in damages.' 2 Today, it is not difficult to bring an
action against a labor union,' 3 and the number of such damage suits
will probably increase. 14 However, the main reason for the popularity
of the injunction as a remedy in labor disputes still exists. The injunc-
tion is a quick and efficient means of controlling the labor activity in-
volved before any damage to the employer has occurred. However,
this remedy has been subject to great abuse in the past to the detri-
ment of labor. History has shown that a temporary restraining order
usually terminates the activity as well as the controversy in court,
9 Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, supra note 6 at 172-73, 143
S.W. 1019-20.
10 Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra note 6 at 490,
222 S.W. 1084.
11 Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657 at 660, 151 S.W. 2d 440 at
442 (1941).
12 Gregory, supra note 3 at 94-95.
13 In Kentucky, an unincorporated voluntary association, such as a labor
union, is not suable in its own name. Sanders v. International Association of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 120 F. Supp. 390 at 392 (W.D.
Ky. 1954); United Mine Workers v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 608, 167 S.W. 891 (1914);
Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra note 6. Such associations
are suable in Kentucky by means of a class action against representatives of the
association. Sanders v. International Association of Bridge, Structural & Orna-
mental Iron Workers, supra this note; Jackson v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, 307 Ky. 485, 211 S.W. 2d 138 (1948); International Union of
Operating Engineers v. Bryan, 255 S.W. 2d 471 (Ky. 1953). In federal courts,
labor unions may sue or be sued in their own name. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(b).
14 See, United Construction Workers v. New Burnside Veneer Co., 274 S.W.
2d 787 (Ky. 1955).
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and often such orders were granted as a matter of course by judges
friendly to business. 15 Even today in Kentucky, an employer may ob-
tain a temporary restraining order without notice to the union, merely
by showing by affidavit that he will suffer immediate and irreparable
injury if the union's alleged conduct is allowed to continue. 6 It is
easy to understand labor's hostility toward injunctive relief, but the
fact remains that in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, the
injunction is held to be a proper remedy to prevent threatened ir-
reparable injury through unlawful labor conduct when there is no
adequate remedy at law.' 7
The Legality of Various Labor Techniques
As has been seen, a person cannot engage in a course of conduct
which will injure another unless he can show justification. Usually,
this requirement is satisfied by showing economic self-interest. How-
ever, a course of conduct may have as its end the achievement of an
unlawful purpose, and in such case, economic self-interest does not
justify the injury.'8 The purpose of this section will be to examine the
application of this principle to various labor activities, viz., strikes,
picketing, and boycotts.
a. strikes
The strike has long been labor's most effective means of securing its
objectives. Labor's use of the strike has never been effectively
hampered in Kentucky, as the Court of Appeals has never upheld an
order enjoining a strike. Kentucky decisions have spoken of labor's
right to strike, 19 a right confirmed by statute.20 Although it has been
asserted that the right to strike falls within the protection of the federal
Constitution under certain circumstances, 21 it is generally accepted
that the right to strike is founded upon economic self-interest rather
than upon a Constitutional right.22 Under either interpretation, a strike
would be unlawful and enjoinable if its object was to coerce an em-
15 Frankfurter and Greene, supra note 3 at 368-80.
16 Rule 65.05, Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
17 31 Am. Jur., Labor, sec. 321 at 991.
18 Id., see. 181 at 921.
19 Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, supra note 6 at 174-75, 143
S.W. at 1020-21; Commonwealth v. Ramey, 279 Ky. 810 at 818-19, 132 S.W. 2d
342 at 346 (1939).
20 Ky. Rev. Stat. 336.130(1) (Hereinafter referred to as KRS).
21 Hotel & Restaurant Employees International v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265,
30 So. 2d 696 (1947).
22 See the opinion of Justice Brandeis in Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306
(1926) and his dissent in Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 at 480-81; also,
International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 250 Wis. 550, 27
N.W. 2d 875 at 880-81 (1947).
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ployer to commit an act which was itself unlawful, and the Court of
Appeals has so indicated by way of dictum.
23
b. picketing
Where picketing has been the labor technique involved, the Con-
stitutional question has had great importance. Beginning with dictum
in the Senn case in 198724 and culminating in the Thornhill2 and
Swing26 decisions of 1940-41, the Supreme Court evolved the doctrine
that peaceful picketing was the laborer's means of communication. As
such, it was said to be within the area of speech protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 However, the Supreme
Court did not contend that all peaceful picketing was necessarily
beyond regulation by the states.28 It was soon established that:
As a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute, peaceful
picketing may be a phase of the constitutional right of free utterance.
But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech
does not imply that the states must be without power to confine the
sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute ... .20
In 1949, the so-called retreat from Thornhill-Swing began with the
application of the illegal purpose doctrine.3 0 It was held that a state
could enjoin picketing which had the purpose of inducing an act by
the employer which would be a violation of a state statuteoa or state
policy as declared by the legislature,3 ' or if its purpose in any way
violated the public policy of the state as expressed by statute3 2 or
judicial determination. 33
23 Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Local No. 181, 244 S.W. 2d 746
at 748 (Ky. 1951).
24 "Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a
State, make known the facts of a labor dispute [by picketing], for freedom of
speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
301 U.S. 468 at 478 (1937).
25 "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information con-
cerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 at 102 (1940).2 6 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 at 325-26 (1941).
27 See also, Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Cafeteria
Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
28 Supra note 25 at 103-05.
29 Carpenters Union v. Bitter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 at 727-28 (1942).
3 0 See, Thurlow Smoot, Stranger Picketing, 42 A.B.A.J. 817 (1956); Osmond
K. Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected?, 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
1 (1950); Ludwig Teller, Picketing-Free Speech, 1950-1951 Va. L. Weekly Dicta
53 (1950).
30a Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
31 Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).3 2 journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
33 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Brother-
hood v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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From these decisions, it is not at all clear to what degree peaceful
picketing is constitutionally protected. On the one hand, it is recog-
nized by supporters of the Thornhill-Swing doctrine that:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dis-
seminated. ... .34
At the same time, those least influenced by the concept of picketing
as free speech recognize that under certain circumstances picketing
is protected under the fourteenth amendment because of the element
of communication involved.33 Possibly the clearest indication of the
Supreme Court's attitude can be found in Frankfurter's statement that:
The effort in the [picketing] cases has been to strike a balance be-
tween the constitutional protection of the element of communication
in picketing and 'the power of the State to set the limits of per-
missable contest open to industrial combatants.'3 6
The facts of each individual case must be examined to determine
whether the restraint placed upon picketing is related to some reason-
able public policy rather than arbitrary and capricious under modern
circumstances.
37
Much of the confusion arises from the two fundamentally different
approaches taken toward picketing. One school of thought has con-
ceived picketing to be a form of economic coercion or pressure rather
than speech or the dissemination of information. To speak of picketing
as speech is said to be mere "sentimentality."38 Picketing is viewed
as only another weapon in the economic struggle between labor and
business, and as such, it is said to be limited by the same considera-
tions that govern every other labor technique. It is pointed out that
no real attempt is made at the picket line to explain the basis of the
particular controversy. Instead, it is the mere presence of the picket
line itself that will bring about the desired end. The picket line rather
than any information or banners will cause others to react as desired
because of fear, sympathy, or pure self-interest.3 9 Although admitting
3 4 Douglas, J., concurring in Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, supra note 27
at 776.
z See Frankfurter, J., in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 33 at 464-65.
3 1; International Brotherhood v. Hanke, supra note 33 at 474.
37 Id. at 479-0.
"-, Gregory, supra note 3 at 348.
39 'In fact, it has now come to be judicially recognized that picketing is,
or at least may be, a form of economic pressure, that many people
refuse to cross a picket line merely because it is a picket line and
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that picketing may be coercive when accompanied by violence or even
a "black look," the other school of thought strongly resents the implica-
tion that all picketing is coercive. They argue that it is to damn by
labeling to call all picketing coercive solely because people often react
to picketing by exerting economic pressure on the employer without
regard to the actual facts of the controversy.4 0 Picketing may be for
no other purpose than communication, and, therefore, it is felt to be
entitled to constitutional protection. 41 The more rational approach
would recognize that there may be both an element of communication
and an element of economic coercion present. On the one hand,
picketing will communicate the fact that a controversy exists if noth-
ing more. At the same time, picketing can cause the employer great
economic loss whether intended or not. The legality of particular
picketing should be judged by considering whether the economic
pressure exerted is justified by self-interest and by the degree to which
there is actual communication of facts and ideas. Where there is little
or no communication involved, the picketing certainly should be sub-
ject to reasonable restraint.
Picketing was associated with freedom of speech as early as 1904
in Kentucky.42 As expressed somewhat later:
The law recognizes the right of peaceful picketing.
Labor has the recognized legal right to acquaint the public with the
facts which it'regards as unfair, to give notoriety to its cause, and to
use persuasive inducements to bring its own policies to triumph.43
However, the Kentucky cases involving injunctions against picketing
have seemingly evidenced a contradictory line of thought. In order
that picketing thus may be intimidating, coercive and o,?pressive
even though it is orderly and free from violence or disorder.
Meltex, Inc. v. Livingston, 28 Labor Cases, par. 69,483, at p. 89,877 (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. 1955); see also Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 33 at 465; Pappas v.
Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A. 2d 497 at 500 (1955); Gregory, supra note 3 at 341-49;
Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Defense, 39 Va. L. Rev. 1053-62 (1953);
Harry H. Rains, The Current Status of Organizational or Recognition Picketing,
7 Labor L.J. 539 at 591-92 (1956).
40 Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A jurisprudence of Epithets,
39 Va. L. Rev. 1023-52 (1953).
41 "[P]eaceful picketing is a form of free speech and as such protected
by constitutional guaranty. To hold otherwise would be to fix a
limitation on the right to express views concerning a labor relation-
ship, and, as we think, invade the right of freedom of speech ... "
Pueblo Building & Construction Trades Council v. Harper Construction Co.,
........ Colo .......... 307 P. 2d 468 (1957); see also Minton, J., dissenting in Inter-
national Brotherhood v. Hanke, supra note 33 at 482-84; Morris D. Forkosch, In-
formational, Representational and Organizational Picketing, 6 Labor L.J. 843 at
859-60 (1955).
42 Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640 at 650, 78 S.W. 482 at 484 (1904).
43 Music Hall Theater v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, supra note 1
at 642-43, 61 S.W. 2d at 285.
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to reconcile these cases, a rather detailed historical approach is
necessary.
The Miller case44 decided in 1938 was the first instance in which
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed a decree enjoining all
picketing. Local 181 solicited membership among Miller's employees.
The employees elected to form their own independent union, and
through the independent union, they signed a collective bargaining
agreement with Miller. When Miller subsequently refused to sign a
closed shop agreement with Local 181, that union began peaceful
picketing of Miller's restaurant. The Court formulated the following
narrow issue:
Where the employees of a business or industry have
organized and concluded a collective contract with the employer in
relation to their wages, hours of labor, and working conditions, may
a general labor union, to which none of the employees have be-
longed, picket the place of business?45
The court answered the question "No," emphasizing that this was
not a case of an employer who had refused to unionize but rather a
case where no industrial dispute existed. Although all further picketing
was enjoined under the decree, the court made no reference to its
earlier statements on the relationship of picketing to free speech.
Under the specific facts involved, the economic self-interest of Local
181 did not justify the infliction of economic injury to Miller by means
of peaceful picketing.
In the Blanford case,46 non-employee union members conducted a
secondary boycott by means of handbills, newspaper advertisements,
and interviews with the employer's customers. The case did not in-
volve stranger or non-employee picketing, but dictum in the case led
to a radical change in the status of picketing in Kentucky. In de-
termining the legality of the boycott involved, the Court of Appeals
examined the legality of other non-employee labor activity, such as
stranger picketing. Despite the narrow holding which the court had
delineated in the Miller case, the court interpreted that case as holding
that all stranger picketing was illegal as against the public policy of
the State. Citing the Thornhill and Swing decisions as holding that
picketing was a protected right under the federal Constitution, the
Court of Appeals stated:
44 Hotel, Restaurant & Soda Fountain Employees v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114
S.W. 2d 501 (1938).
45 Id. at 469, 114 S.W. 2d at 503.4 6 Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 11.
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Since the Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the
Federal Constitution, no distinction may hereafter be drawn by a
state court between the acts which may be committed by employees
in futherance of their interests and those which may be committed
by non-employee members of a labor union in the furtherance of its
interests. Hence, members of any labor union, so long as they refrain
from acts of violence, may not be enjoined from picketing the
premises of any person against whom the union has a grievance, or
from conducting a boycott against his business, notwithstanding the
consequences to him, his accord with his own employees, or his
inability to grant the demands made upon him by the union.47
(emphasis added)
Although the effect of this strong dictum was great, it was not recog-
nized as being dictum. The Blanford case has been cited erroneously
as a case involving stranger picketing,48 and the total absence of cases
involving picketing from 1941 to 1951 would indicate that all peaceful
picketing was considered lawful on the basis of the Blanford dictum.
In 1951, the Court of Appeals made its first reference to the Su-
preme Court decisions which, by applying the illegal purpose doctrine,
restricted the right to picket peacefully.49 It was pointed out in the
Broadway case5" that a Kentucky statute5' prohibited an employer
from interfering with an employee in the choice of his bargaining
agent. The employer had argued that if there was picketing by a
union to secure recognition as sole bargaining agent for all employees
at a time when the union did not represent all employees, the picketing
was illegal since its purpose was to compel the employer to violate
the statute. The court agreed that "an act by an employer which
would be a crime or a violation of a legislative enactment or contrary
to a defined public policy is not a proper object of concerted action
against him by workers,"52 but found that the union was not in fact
seeking to compel an unlawful act. It was not until 1953 in the Blue
Boar case53 that the court found that the picketing was for the illegal
purpose of compelling the employer to coerce his employees in the
choice of their bargaining agent and upheld an injunction prohibiting
all peaceful picketing. The Blue Boar decision was followed in two
subsequent cases in which recognition picketing was enjoined.54 As
at least one employee was involved in the picketing in one instance,
-1 Id. at 664, 151 S.W. 2d at 444.
48 Whitt v. Stephens, 246 S.W. 2d 996, at 997 (Ky. 1951); Blue Boar Cafe-
teria v. Hotel & Restaurant & Bartenders International, supra note 7 at 338.
49 Boyd v. Deena Artware Inc., 239 S.W. 2d 86 at 90 (Ky. 1951).
50 Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Local No. 181, supra note 23.
51 KRS 836.130(1).
52 Id. at 748.
53 Blue Boar Cafeteria v. Hotel & Restaurant & Bartenders International,
supra note 7.
54 Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Lambert, 258 S.W. 2d 694 (Ky. 1953);
Local No. 227 v. F. B. Purnell Sausage Co., 264 S.W. 2d 870 (Ky. 1953).
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it would seem that the illegal purpose doctrine is applicable to em-
ployee or primary picketing as well as stranger picketing, but this
point was not clearly stated by the courtY5 The Blue Boar decision
raises two serious questions which will be discussed: (1) the present
validity of the Miller holding and (2) the circumstances under which
picketing is in fact to force the employer to coerce his employees in
violation of state statute.
It seems clear that stranger picketing by union A to secure recogni-
tion as the sole bargaining representative for all employees should
clearly be against public policy if the employer has entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with union B which is the duly
selected representative of the employees. Although purporting to
overrule the Miller case, the Blanford case is not in direct conflict
with that holding and even recognizes the policy considerations be-
hind the decision, the court resting its holding on Supreme Court
cases deemed to be controlling.50 Under the rationale of the Blue
Boar case, the Miller holding should be valid today since recognition
of union A by the employer would be a clear interference with his
employees' statutory right to choose union B as their representative.
57
It should be noted that the basis of such a decision would be the fact
that the purpose of the picketing is illegal by statute. Although the
Supreme Court has upheld state decisions enjoining picketing where
the object was a violation of public policy as expressed by the state
judiciary, 8 judicial determination of the validity or invalidity of the
purpose may lead to begging the question in certain instances.5 9 The
safest test would be whether the person picketed could comply with
the object sought without violating either the common or statutory
55 Local No. 227 v. F. B. Purnell Sausage Co., supra note 54.
50 Supra note 11 at 662, 151 S.W. 2d 443.
57 "Employes may, free from restraint or coercion by the employers or
their agents, associate collectively for self-organization and designate
collectively representatives of their own choosing to negotiate the terms
and conditions of their employment to effectively promote their own
rights and general welfare ... " KRS 336.130(1).
58 "The fact that California's policy is expressed by the judicial organ
of the State rather than by the legislature we have repeatedly ruled
to be immaterial."
Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 33 at 466-67; International Brotherhood v.
Hanke, supra note 33 at 479.
59 An example of such judicial reasoning is an Idaho decision in which peace-
ful picketing was enjoined because it had the illegal purpose "to intimidate, coerce
and compel plaintiff to enter into an agreement with defendant union, and by use
of economic coercion by defendants, to destroy plaintiff's freedom of contracting."
J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerk's International Association, .... Ida ..... 298 P.
2d 375 at 377, 379 (1956), reversed per curiam, Retail Clerks International
Association v. J. J. Newberry Co ......... U.S ......... 1 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1957) on
the ground that the state was without jurisdiction in the case.
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law of the state.G0 However, the fact remains that state courts have
declared the purpose of picketing to be illegal under some circum-
stances in the absence of statute, even though the person picketed
would not have been subject to legal sanctions had he acquiesced in
the purpose of the picketing.
61
The Blue Boar case did not provide an adequate test by which
to determine whether particular picketing has as its purpose the illegal
coercion of employees by means of pressure upon the employer. Sub-
sequent Kentucky decisions and similar cases in other jurisdictions
also fail to provide a workable approach to the problem. Some courts
doubt that it is possible to make any rational distinction between
picketing which is directed at informing and appealing to employees
and that in which the objective is illegal coercion.62 It is argued that
any picketing will result in economic loss to the employer, and that
the employer tends to exert strong pressure on the employees to
recognize the union as their bargaining representative in order to
avoid such injury.63 It is also felt that employees are cognizant of the
economic peril of picketing to their employer's business and, hence, to
their jobs. Such pressures make it impossible for the employees to
make a free choice of bargaining representatives. 4 Therefore, the
effect of all organizational picketing is felt to be coercive, and at least
one state has declared all such picketing to be illegal.65
While some courts have agreed that organizational picketing is
60 Fraenkel, supra note 30 at 8-9.61 Hughes v. Superior Court, supra note 33; International Brotherhood v.
Hanke, supra note 33; Bitzer Motor Co. v. Local 604, 349 Ill. 283, 110 N.E. 2d
674 (1952);,Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 128 N.E. 2d 823 (1955).
62 'The attempt to draw distinctions as to whether . . . picketing is
done in order to get the employees to join the union or done in order
to get the employer to get his employees to join the union impresses
me as wholly lacking in any reality. I cannot even think of what
criterion can be invoked in order to determine whether the picketing
of employer A by union X is one or the other. Certainly, the criterion
cannot be whether the picketing does or does not cause the employer
to succumb to the temptation to say to his employees 'join this X
union or you will be fired.' Certainly, too, it would be ecually in-
admissable to let determination rest on whether the union s lawyer
describes the object as being one or the other, or on whether some
union organizer, unskilled in the accurate use of words or unconscious
of the legal effect of his words, says 'we are picketing in order to
get the employees of A to join our union' or 'we are picketing in
order to make A tell his employees to join our union or get fired."
Meltex, Inc. v. Livingston, supra note 39, 28 Labor Cases at p. 89,875-76; see
Blue Boar Cafeteria v. Hotel & Restaurant & Bartenders International, supra note
7 at 839; Pappas v. Stacey, supra note 39 at 116 A. 2d 500; Rains, supra note 39
at 539, 542, 591-92.63 Bellerive Country Club v. McVey . ....... Mo ......... 284 S.W. 2d 492 at
500 (1955).
64 Pappas v. Stacey, supra note 39 at 500.
65 Id.
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coercive in effect, the vast majority have held it to be lawful in the
absence of a showing that its purpose is coercion of the employees
through pressure upon the employer. °6 Since a union will seldom
admit that the purpose is other than peaceful pursuasion of the em-
ployees, courts have usually had to infer the illegal purpose from the
actions of the union, but it is not always clear which factors are im-
portant in making such an inference. In the Kentucky decisions in
which an injunction against organizational picketing was upheld, the
picketing followed the employer's refusal to accede to a demand for
a union contract67 or recognition as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive.68 Although courts will infer that the picketing was for the illegal
purpose of enforcing these demands, the presence of such demands is
not a prerequisite to a finding that the purpose is illegal. 0 Courts
have stressed the fact that the union had made no real effort to com-
municate with the employees personally70 or that the pickets' placards
were directed at the employer and third persons. 71 The illegal purpose
has been inferred where the picketing has been confined to those
entrances through which the employer must receive supplies72 and
where the picketing occurred at the time at which the employer's
business was greatest.73 Courts have also been quick to find an illegal
purpose when the picketing was accompanied by violence, misrepre-
sentation, and harassing tactics,7 4 but the fact that means used in con-
ducting the picketing were illegal is a poor basis upon which to hold
that the purpose is illegal. A finding of illegal means does not neces-
sitate the conclusion that the purpose was also illegal. No one factor
'6 See annotation 11 A.L.R. 2d 1338.67 Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Lambert, supra note 54.
6 8 Blue Boar Cafeteria v. Hotel & Restaurant & Bartenders International,
supra note 7; Local No. 227 v. F. B. Purnell Sausage Co., supra note 54.
69 Anchorage v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547, 119 A. 2d 199
(1956).7 0 Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, supra note 63; Chucales v. Royalty,
supra note 61; Sansom House Enterprises v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 382 Pa.
475, 115 A. 2d 746 (1955); but see Wood v. O'Grady, 307 N.Y. 532, 122 N.E. 2d
386 at 387 (1954).
71 "Certainly the request on the banners that the friends and sym-
pathizers of the Local should not patronize plaintiff's restaurant had
no relevancy whatever to an appeal to the employes to join the Union
but could be intended only to damage or destroy the business of the
employer until it should succumb to the Local's demands."
Anchorage v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, supra note 69, 119 A. 2d at 203; see
also, Audubon Homes v. Spokane Building & Construction Trades Council,
........ Wash .......... 298 P. 2d 1112 at 1115 (1956).72 Baderak v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 830 Pa. 477, 112 A.
2d 170 (1955).73 Bellerive Country Club v. MeVey, supra note 63.
74 Sansom House Enterprises v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, supra note 70;
Meltex, Inc. v. Livingston, supra note 39; Anchorage v. Waiters & Waitresses
Union, supra note 69.
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can be said to be controlling, and it has been found that the purpose
was lawful even though several of the above factors were present7
5
The question of organizational picketing is probably the most
pressing problem of labor law in state courts today. However, an
examination of the vast number of these cases leaves the impression
that the arguments put forward by both labor and management are
unrealistic. It is naive to conceive of organizational picketing as a
rational appeal to employees to join this union as opposed to that
union. It is equally as unrealistic to believe that decisions such as the
Blue Boar case are primarily to prevent employees from being coerced
in the choice of their bargaining representative. In all organizational
picketing, the employer is the person who will suffer economically,
and it is he who seeks the injunction. Against the recognized interest
of unions to secure industry-wide unionization,7 the courts have had
to balance the interests of the employer who has a mutually satis-
factory relationship with his employees. At best, they have been able
to achieve only rough justice. The most reasonable solution would
seem to be legislation which would provide machinery for conducting
organizational drives whereby the interests of all parties-employee,
employer, union, and public-would be protected. 77 If such machinery
could be perfected, any need for organizational picketing with its at-
tendant economic loss and ill will would be eliminated.
c. boycotts
The third major labor technique is the boycott. The simplest form
of the boycott is the primary boycott in which direct pressure is
brought to bear on the employer by the union through a refusal to
purchase the employer's product or by withdrawing the union's
services in a strike.78 So long as it is conducted for a legitimate objec-
tive, the primary boycott is a lawful labor activity.79 However, a union
may be unable to secure its demands by means of direct pressure upon
the employer, and it may then seek to enlist the aid of third parties or
neutrals to the dispute. In the secondary boycott, the union re-enforces
its pressures by getting the third parties to deny the employer necessary
services and goods or to cease consumption of his products.8 0 In seek-
ing to enlist the support of neutrals, the union may resort to peaceful
75Wood v. O'Grady, supra note 70.7 8 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 at 209
(1921).
77 See John L. Johnson, The Development of Labor Management Legislation
in Kentucky, 45 Ky. L.J. 40 at 55, 69-71, 102-03 (1956).
7 1 CCH Labor L. Rep., par. 237.
79Prosser, Torts, see. 107 at 756 (2nd Ed. 1955).
80 1 CCH Labor L. Rep., par. 237.
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persuasion or it may exert economic pressure on the neutral by the
same means that pressure is exerted upon the employer with whom
it has the dispute.8 '
As a general rule, unions may request third parties to refrain from
dealing with the employer,82 and the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
refused to allow injunctions which would restrain unions from re-
questing the general public83 or retail stores8 4 to refrain from patroniz-
ing the employer. In the Purnell Sausage Co. case,85 picketing was
enjoined under the Blue Boar doctrine on the ground that it was for
the illegal purpose of forcing the employer to coerce his employees in
violation of KRS 336.130, but the union was not enjoined from re-
questing retailers to cease stocking the employer's product. Although
the ultimate object of these requests was clearly the same as the
admitted illegal purpose of the picketing, the court attempted to dis-
tmguish the Blue Boar case, stating:
[In the Blue Boar case] the solicitation of the public not to patronize
Blue Boar cafeterias was by the pickets themselves; and the display
of the sign urging a boycott of Blue Boar cafeterias was so closely
connected with the picketing as to constitute merely an extension
of the picket line ... 86
The court cannot have meant that requests which seek to achieve an
illegal objective are not constitutionally protected when made on a
picket line, but that the same requests for the same ends are non-
enjoinable and constitutionally protected when uttered independent
of a picket line. The only rational reason for such a distinction must
be a belief that such a secondary consumption boycott would have
little coercive effect and that any pressure brought to bear on the
employees of the Purnell Sausage Co. would be too remote to justify
enjoining the union's requests. However, such an approach seems to
be unrealistic, since an effective secondary boycott will cause the
employer to interfere with his employees' rights as quickly as would
effective picketing.87 If the public policy behind the Blue Boar decision
is sound, it should be immaterial that the evil complained of is to be
achieved by enlisting the aid of third parties.
81 J. Denson Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in Labor Disputes-The
Secondary Boycott, 1 La. L. Rev. 277 at 278-79 (1939).
82 Jerome R. Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 Yale L.J.
341 at 350-51, 357 (1939); Smith, supra note 81 at 278.
83 Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 11.
84 Local No. 227 v. F. B. Pumell Sausage Co., supra note 54.
85 Ibid.
86 Id. at 871.
87 As a result of the union's requests, the Purnell Company lost sixteen
customers who together did an average monthly business of $1,064.55 with
Purnell. Appellee's brief on petition for rehearing, p. 4-5.
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A related problem has arisen in Kentucky when employees of a
common carrier have refused to cross a picket line at an employer's
plant to pick up or deliver goods. In the American Tobacco Co. case,88
the Court of Appeals held that employees of common carriers could
not lawfully refuse to serve any customer so long as they voluntarily
remained in the carrier's hire, and they were enjoined from refusing
to cross a picket line at plaintiffs plant. The court stated that motor
carriers had a duty to serve all customers without discrimination and
the employees' interference with that duty was a violation of state
statute.8 9 A provision in the contract between the carrier and his em-
ployees which provided that the employees were not required to cross
picket lines was held to be no justification 0° Since the effectiveness of
picketing may, to a large degree, depend on its ability to curtail the
movement of goods in and out of the picketed establishment,91 the
American Tobacco Co. case offered a means by which an employer
might escape serious economic loss during lawful picketing. However,
several limitations to this decision should be noted. In the American
Tobacco Co. case, the carrier employees were not on strike but were
participating in a partial work stoppage only.92 Where the carrier's
employees are on strike, the picketed employer could not complain,
since under the better view the strike would relieve the carrier of
his duty to serve the employer.9 3 If the picketing has been Accom-
panied by violence or intimidation, a carrier's employees are clearly
justified in refusing to cross the picket line since the common carrier's
duty does not require him to subject his employees to bodily harm.
94
More important, however, than these limitations in the decision itself,
federal labor relations legislation has severely limited the power of
the states to act in such cases.9 4a
88 General Drivers v. American Tobacco Co., 258 S.W. 2d 903 (Ky. 1953),
modified on rehearing, 264 S.W. 2d 250 (Ky. 1954), reversed per curiam 348 U.S.
978 (1955) on the ground that the state did not have jurisdiction in the case; see
infra note 123.
89 Id. at 253; "[N]or shall any common carrier . . . make or give any un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any person, or subject any person to any
unreasonable discrimination." KRS 281.685; KRS 281.990.
90 Ibid.
91 See Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, supra note 63.
92 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486 at 496 (CA8
1946).93 Harold I. Elbert and Gregory M. Rebman, Common Carriers and Picket
Lines, 1955 Wash. U.L.Q. 232 at 233-36 (1955); see dictum in Illinois Central
R. Co. v. River & Rail Coal & Coke Co., 150 Ky. 489 at 493, 150 S.W. 641 at 648
(1912).9 4 CMinneapolis & St. Louis R. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F. 2d 126
(CA8 1954); Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F. 2d 296 (CA8
1956); Elbert & Rebman, supra note 93.
94a See infra note 123.
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Only two Kentucky decisions are found in which strikers picketed
an employer with whom they had no dispute as a means of applying
additional pressure on their own employer, and in both cases the Court
of Appeals refused to enjoin such activity.95 In both instances, there
were peculiar circumstances which allowed the court to justify the
picketing without holding that all such picketing is lawful as a general
rule. In Boyd v. Deena Artware, Inc.,96 strikers picketed the construc-
tion of a new building on the plaintiff company's property although
the contractor had no dispute with either the strikers or his own em-
ployees. It was acknowledged that additional pressure was exerted
upon the plaintiff company through the refusal of the contractor's
employees to cross the picket line, but the court held that the plaintiff
company could not secure an injunction prohibiting the union from
picketing the contractor. The court considered the picketing of the
contractor to be only an extension of the lawful picketing of the
plaintiff company, since the construction area was an integral part of
the industrial facilities of the company. Moreover, the court stated
that the plaintiff company could not avail itself of any rights of the
contractor which might have been infringed.97 In the American To-
bacco Co. case,98 strikers picketed the plaintiff parent company, with
whom it had no dispute, as well as the subsidiary company against
whom they were striking. The facilities of the two companies were
so integrated physically that it was impossible to picket the subsidiary
company without also picketing the plaintiff parent company. More
important was the fact that the parent company could not be con-
sidered a neutral in the dispute. The court emphasized that the two
companies were so closely allied that they should be considered as
engaged in a single operation.99 From these two decisions, it is not
clear whether it is lawful in Kentucky to conduct a secondary boycott
by applying economic pressure rather than persuasion on third parties
who are neither allied nor physically integrated with the employer
with whom the union has its primary dispute. 100
Writers have taken two approaches to the problem of secondary
boycotts in which the union has used economic coercion to enlist the
05 Boyd v. Deena Artware, Inc., supra note 49; General Drivers v. American
Tobacco Co., supra note 88.96 Supra note 49.
97 Ibid.
98 Supra note 88.
09 Id. at 252.
1 J0 See Byck Brothers & Co. v. Martin, 4 Labor Cases, par. 60,430 (Cir. Ct.,
Jefferson Co., Ky. 1941). The union had a dispute with a contractor who hired
non-union men. When the plaintiff employer hired the contractor to re-decorate
his store, the union picketed the store. The circuit court refused to enjoin the
picketing, citing Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 11.
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
aid of third parties. One school maintains that there can be no real
neutral in a labor dispute. Third parties aid an employer in a labor dis-
pute if they refuse to abstain from patronizing him, and if they do
cease dealing with the employer, they are aiding the union. Hence,
it is argued that one must be an ally of either the employer or the
union in any labor dispute; neutrality is impossible. According to this
view, the union would be justified in applying any pressure on the
employer's 'ally' which it could lawfully exert on the employer him-
self.1' 1 However, this approach neglects the fact that the employer
would be equally justified in bringing economic pressure to bear on
the third party if he acceded to the union's demand, leaving the third
party caught between the pressure of both participants in the dispute.
The other view rejects the proposition that the relationship between
an employer and his customers or suppliers justifies the union's in-
flicting economic loss on the latter.102 A sound public policy should
recognize that it is socially undesirable to allow the participants in
labor disputes to seek the aid of third parties by coercion rather than
persuasion.
103
The Regulation of Labor Techniques
While the debate on labor's right to strike and picket has been
long and impassioned, it has been generally recognized that numerous
illegal or tortious acts are enjoinable even though accompanying
otherwise legal activities.10 4 The purpose of this section will be to
determine what acts may be enjoined, and the extent to which legiti-
mate labor techniques may be restricted because of accompanying
illegal acts.
Where a labor technique such as picketing has been accompanied
by overt acts of violence, intimidation, and threats of violence to per-
son or property, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has consistently
held that such conduct may be enjoined.10 5 Whether picketing is
intimidating must turn on the particular facts of each case for, as
stated in the Restatement:
The question is in each case whether the number of pickets plus the
attendant circumstances are such that fear of physical harm rather
than persuasion is the force loosed upon the persons sought to be in-
fluenced. Thus it is important to consider the kind of place picketed
and the character of persons sought to be influenced, that is, for ex-
11 Hellerstein, supra note 82 at 354-55.
102 Smith, supra note 81 at 284-85. 103 Id. at 280-81.
104 See, Music Hall Theater v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, supra note
1 at 642-43, 61 S.W. 2d at 285.
105 Underhill v. Murphy, supra note 42 at 650, 78 S.W. at 484; Music Hall
Theater v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, supra note 1 at 643-44, 61 S.W.
2d at 285; Boyd v. Deena Artware, Inc., supra note 49 at 88; Local No. 181 v.
Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co., 248 S.W. 2d 713 (Ky. 1952).
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ample, whether the place picketed is a foundry approached only by
men or a department store patronized chiefly by women . . . And it
is important to consider the conduct of the pickets: whether they be-
have in a quiet orderly manner or are boisterous and equipped with
weapons of physical harm ... .106
Violence and intimidation have not been the only conduct enjoined.
Picketing must be truthful, and an employer is entitled to an injunction
when he is subjected to defamation or misrepresentation. 0 7 On the
ground that it constitutes a breach of peace, the Court of Appeals has
held that verbal abuse may be enjoined, including calling non-strikers
"scabs" and other derogatory names. 08 The court has also held that
pickets cannot resort to annoyance and harassment of the general
public. 00
However, the presence of any or several of these types of conduct
does not necessarily entitle an employer to an injunction as a matter
of right. The Court of Appeals has stated:
[An injunction will not] issue in a case of this character where there
is no proof of irreparable injury or the evidence fails to show that the
acts complained of are likely to be continued, nor will an injunction
lie because of a single act of trespass in entering upon the premises
of the complainant where there is no threatened repetition of the
act."10 (emphasis added)
Whenever a court issues an injunction because of illegal conduct in
a labor dispute, it should as a general rule be careful to enjoin only
that conduct which is unlawful, and all lawful activity should be al-
lowed to continue."' However, evidence of the past history of a labor
100 Restatement, Torts, See. 779, comment h.
107 Music Hall Theater v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, supra note 1
at 644, 61 S.W. 2d at 285; Hotel, Restaurant & Soda Fountain Employees v.
Miller, supra note 44 at 469, 114 S.W. 2d at 508; dictum, Paducah Newspapers
v. Wise, 247 S.W. 2d 989 at 990, 992 (Ky. 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 942
(1952); cf. Blossom Dairy Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 125
W. Va. 165, 23 S.E. 2d 645 at 649-50 (1942).
108 Boyd v. Deena Artware, Inc., supra note 49 at 88-89; contra, Walter A.
Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. Rep. 185, 186 N.Y.S.
95 at 98 (Sup. Ct. 1921): "The nomenclature of the strike is not the language
of the parlor.'
10 Music Hall Theater v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, supra note 1
at 644, 61 S.W. 2d at 285; Tallman Co. v. Latal, ........ Mo .......... 284 S.W. 2d 547
at 552 (1955).
110 Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra note 6 at 489,
222 S.V. at 1084.
111 Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, supra note 27 at 295-96; Pezold
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 54 Cal. App. 2d 120, 128
P. 2d 611 at 615-17 (Dist. Ct. of App., Calif. 1942); Grist v. Textile Workers, 78
R.I. 338, 82 A. 2d 402 at 403 (1951); Restatement, Torts, Sec. 815. See, Boyd
v. Deena Artware, Inc., supra note 49 at 89; the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
reversed, as a violation of the guaranty of freedom of assembly given by Sec. 1(6)
of the Kentucky Constitution, that part of a decree which enjoined all congrega-
tions of strikers near plaintiff's plant even though such assembly might be for a
legal purpose and peaceful.
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dispute may show that it has been impossible to conduct picketing
without attendant acts of violence. In such extreme cases, all picketing
may be enjoined even though it would prohibit picketing which might
be conducted in a lawful manner.1 2 More common are injunctions
restricting the number of pickets and requiring that a certain distance
be maintained between pickets so as to provide free access to and
from the picketed establishment and to prevent the obstruction of
public streets. z3 Courts have also restricted the picketing to the situs
of the dispute.114 Although such regulation is proper when reasonably
related to the maintenance of public peace and welfare, legal labor
activities should not be hamstrung by unnecessary and arbitrary re-
strictions. An injunction which is unduly restrictive and technical
invites violation and can serve no useful purpose.
Federal Versus State Jurisdiction
The enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1947115 greatly magnified the prob-
lem of determining the extent to which state power in labor disputes
affecting interstate commerce has been pre-empted by federal legisla-
tion.116 Prior to 1947, the NLRA was primarily concerned with the
protection of thd rights of employees against certain unfair practices
by employers, but the Taft-Hartley amendments provided a compre-
hensive plan for the regulation of union as well as employer conduct.
This increase in the scope of the NLRA has resulted in a much
greater diminution in state power to enjoin unlawful labor conduct.
However, the practicing attorney is faced with the fact that "the areas
112 Local No. 181 v. Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co., supra note 105.
All picketing was enjoined after the following acts of violence: empRloyees were
assaulted; rocks and bricks were thrown through the windows of employees'
homes at night; poison was placed in food served to employees and guests of a
hotel; explosive and stench bombs were placed in hotel lobbies on the night be-
fore the Kentucky Derby; a truck belonging to a company making deliveries to the
plaintiff was dynamited; a policeman was cut while attempting to arrest a picket
carrying an open knife; and acid was thrown in the faces of two women employees.
See also, Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
113 United States Electrical Motor Co. v. United Electrical Radio, and
Machine Workers, 166 P. 2d 921 (Super. Ct., Calif. 1946); Western Electric Co.
v. Western Electric Employees Association, 137 N.J. Eq. 489, 45 A. 2d 695
(1946); Lily Dache v. Rose, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 303 at 305-06 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 1941);
Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72 F. Supp. 533 at 537 (D.C. Hawaii 1947);
Boyd v. Deena Artware, Inc., supra note 49.
114 Carpenters Union v. Bitter's Cafe, supra note 29; Allen-Bradley Local v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 237 Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791 at 793
(1941), aff. 315 U.S. 740 (1942); Bell v. Rogers, 30 LRRM 2731 at 2738-34 (Ct.
of Com. Pleas, Ohio 1952).
115 29 U.S.C., Chap. 7.
116 See, Archibald Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 1297 (1954); William J. Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versus
State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1955).
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that have been pre-empted by federal authority and thereby with-
drawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed
metes and bounds." 117
As Congress exercised its power under the commerce clause to the
fullest degree by extending the scope of the NLRA to all labor dis-
putes affecting interstate commerce, 118 the conflict between state and
federal power in the field is a constant problem. Although there are
some who argue that Congress intended to occupy the entire field so
as to foreclose any state action in the area, 19 the Supreme Court has
taken the position that the federal legislation "leaves much to the
states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." 20
It is quite clear that a state cannot enjoin any activities which are
protected by the NLBA, 12 ' and in the Garner case,'122 the Supreme
Court held that a state has no jurisdiction to enjoin an activity which
is an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Whenever an employer's
complaint directly or indirectly alleges conduct which would be either
protected or prohibited under federal law, the state court must decline
jurisdiction.123 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that
the states retain jurisdiction over conduct which is not regulated in
any manner by the NLRA.124 A state court may award damages in a
common law tort action arising out of acts which could also have
been enjoined by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as an
unfair labor practice, since the nature of the two remedies is dif-
ferent.125 The only instances in which duplication of state and federal
remedies has been tolerated are those in which violence, mass picket-
ing, and threats of violence are present. The interest of the state in
the prevention of violence and property damage is so great that the
state may enjoin such conduct even though it constitutes a violation
of Sec. 8(b) (1) of the NLRA. 126
Although other states have been reluctant to admit the extent of
117 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 at 480 (1955).
118 National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 806 U.S. 601 at 607 (1939).
119 Harry Brody, Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor Relations, 5
Labor L.J. 743 at 759 (1954).
120 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 at 488 (1953).
121 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); International Union of Automobile
Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Amalgamated Association of Bus Em-
ployees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
122 Supra note 120.
12 3 Weber v. Anheuser-busch, supra note 117; General Drivers v. American
Tobacco Co., supra note 88.
124 International Union of Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 at 264-65 (1949).
125 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656 at 665 (1954).
126 United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
351 U.S. 266 at 272-75 (1956).
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federal pre-emption in labor disputes, 127 the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky has frankly recognized the limitations on state power in the
area. In National Electric Service Corp. v. District 50,12s it was held
that the Blue Boar doctrine could not be applied to disputes affecting
interstate commerce, since such picketing would also constitute an
unfair labor practice under sec. 8(b) (2) of the NLRA. Although
recognizing the wide import of the Garner case, the Court of Appeals
made it clear that Kentucky still had jurisdiction in cases involving
violence and intimidation.
When an employer invokes the machinery of the NLRB, he cannot
simultaneously seek relief from a state court. In such case, the NLRB
may maintain the integrity of its jurisdiction by securing a decree from
a federal district court enjoining the employer from prosecuting the
state action.129 However, if the employer bypasses the NLRB and
seeks relief only from a state court, the union cannot remove the case
to federal court, since the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in
labor disputes is limited to enforcement of NLRB orders. 30 Con-
sequently, if a state court erroneously assumes jurisdiction, a union
cannot avoid any injunction of that court unless it is reversed by a
higher state court or ultimately by the Supreme Court. In all prob-
ability, the employer will have achieved his purpose by the time the
injunction is dissolved for want of jurisdiction.131 In view of the
complexities of the NLRA and the difficulty in applying the Act to
specific controversies, the possibility of state courts' erroneously as-
suming jurisdiction is great.1 32 Even in cases in which the employer
did not seek state relief until after his complaint had been dismissed
by the NLRB, it is often difficult to determine whether the state court
may exercise jurisdiction. The state would have power to act only
if the conduct involved was not regulated by the NLRA, and the
NLRB may have dismissed the complaint because the conduct was
protected by the NLRA.1
3 3
127 Freydberg, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 128
N.Y.S. 2d 470 at 472 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 1954); Meltex, Inc. v. Livingston, supra
note 39, 28 Labor Cases at p. 89,878; Baylis v. Quinonez, 286 App. Div. 1030, 29
Labor Cases, par. 69,517 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 1955).
128 279 S.W. 2d 808 (1955).
129 Capital Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 501
(1954).
130 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511
(1955).
131 Id., Douglas, J., dissenting, at 526.
'L3 2 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, supra note 117 at 481; General Drivers v.
American Tobacco Co., supra note 88; Local Union No. 25 v. New York, N.H.
& H.R. Co., 350 U.S. 155 (1956); J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks Inter-
national Association, supra note 59.
133 Note, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 540 at 548-50 (1956).
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By establishing jurisdictional yardsticks based upon a certain
minimum volume of business, the NLRB has contracted the area in
which it will assert its jurisdiction.14 Although the NLRB has been
criticized for refusing to exercise its full jurisdiction,135 the Supreme
Court has indicated that the NLRB's powers are discretionary rather
than mandatory.136 In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,137 the
Supreme Court held that the states do not have jurisdiction in those
cases in which the NLRB will not exercise its jurisdiction. Under sec.
10(a) of the NLRA, the NLRB is granted the power to cede jurisdic-
tion in certain areas by agreements with state agencies if the state law
is the same as the federal law. 138 Emphasizing the legislative history
of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, the Supreme Court held that
sec. 10(a) "is the exclusive means whereby States may be enabled to
act concerning the matters which Congress has entrusted to the
National Labor Relations Board."139 Although some courts had an-
ticipated the Guss decision,140 a number of state courts had held that
they could enter the area abandoned by the NLRB.141 The latter
courts pointed out the resulting chaos that would result from a juris-
dictional no-man's land in which unlawful labor activity would be
subject to neither state nor federal control. While recognizing this
problem, the Supreme Court stated that the solution must rest with
Congress.
42
There are several possible solutions to the situation created by the
134 1 CCH Labor L. Rep., par. 1610 at p. 1613.
135 Redmond H. Roche, Jr. and Kurt L. Hanslowe, NLRB Absolutism-A
Dogma Revisited, 6 Labor L.J. 279 at 293-94 (1955).
13 "Even when the effect of the activities on interstate commerce is suf-
ficient to enable the Board to take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board some-
times properly declines to do so, stating that the policies of the Act would not be
effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case." National Labor Relations
Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 at 684;
see also Office Employees International Union v. National Labor Relations Board,.....U.S ..... 77 S.Ct. 799 at 803 (1957).137 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598 (1957); see also the companion cases, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc .......... U.S.
........ , 77 S.Ct. 604 (1957) and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
........ U.S .......... 77 S.Ct. 607 (1957).
138 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(a).
139 Cuss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra note 137, 77 S.Ct. at 602.
140 Retail Clerks Local No. 1564 v. Your Food Stores, 225 F. 2d 659 at 663
(CA10 1955); Universal Car & Service Co. v. International Association of Ma-
chinists, 27 Labor Cases, par. 68,825 at p. 87,759-64 (Cir. Ct., Mich. 1954);
New York State Labor Relations Board v. Wags Transportation System, 130
N.Y.S. 2d 731 at 741-44 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. 1954).
141 Hammer v. Local No. 211, 34 N.J. Super. 34, 111 A. 2d 308 at 317-18
(1954); Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P. 2d
1 at 5-6 (1955), reversed San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra
note 137; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 5 Utah 2d 68, 296 P. 2d 733 at
734-38 (1956), reversed, supra note 137.
142 CUss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra note 137, 77 S.Ct. at 603.
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Guss decision. Although the Supreme Court has thus far refused to
pass on the question,143 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would
hold that the present jurisdictional yardstick is an unreasonable exer-
cise of the NLRB's discretionary powers, even though it may have
been the purpose of those standards to allow greater state regulation
of labor disputes as well as to lighten the pressing number of cases
before the NLRB.144 However, the ultimate solution must lie with
Congress as it seems evident that the NLRB may refrain from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction in many cases. The NLRB has suggested that the
states be allowed to assume jurisdiction in these cases so long as they
apply federal law.145 While this plan seems to reach a reasonable
solution, states would find it difficult to apply federal law in the
absence of agencies comparable to the NLRB,'140 and at the present
time there is no state labor board which meets the requirements of
see. 10(a) of the NLRA.147 Probably the most practical solution
would be Congressional legislation establishing jurisdictional yardsticks
similar to those used by the NLRB. Such yardsticks would delineate
the line between federal and state authority clearly. If, on the other
hand, Congress feels that a uniform national labor policy should be
applied to all labor disputes affecting interstate commerce, the only
solution would seem to be a great expansion of the machinery of the
NLRB which would enable the NLRB to handle all the cases which
would come before it. Whatever the eventual Congressional action
may be, it is important that it mark out the line between state and
federal jurisdiction with much more precision than it has in the past.
The long litigation in a recent Kentucky labor dispute vividly illus-
trates the confusion that may be caused by the jurisdictional question.
The employer secured a temporary injunction in a state circuit court
against picketing by the union. The union attempted to remove that
case to the federal district court on the ground that the state court
was without jurisdiction. However, the federal district court ruled
that it could not exercise jurisdiction even though the state court
might be without jurisdiction.148 A year later, the state court dissolved
its injunction on the ground that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction
over the conduct involved, even though it was clear that the NLRB
143 Id., 77 S.Ct. at 599.
144 Compare the majority opinion with the dissents of Members Murdock
and Patterson in Breeding Transfer Co., 110 NLRB No. 64 at p. 497, 502-03, 528
(1954).
145 5 CCH Labor L. Rep., par. 50,267 at p. 50,522; 25 L.W. 3212.
146 5 CCH Labor L. Rep., par. 50,267 at p. 50, 523.
147 Dissent, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra note 137, 77 S.Ct. at
611.
148 Food Basket v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 124 F.
Supp. 463 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
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would not hear the case since the employer's volume of business was
less than the minimum set by the NLRB's jurisdictional yardstick.149
By the time that the Court of Appeals ruled on the case the following
year, the question was moot since the employer's business had in-
creased so that it then met the NLRB's standards. 50 It is quite clear
that a speedy determination of labor disputes will be difficult, if not
impossible in some instances, unless the line between state and federal
jurisdiction is much more clearly drawn than it is at the present time.
Conclusions
The rights of participants in a labor dispute in Kentucky have
been based upon the doctrine that self-interest justifies the infliction
of economic loss on another. Under the common law of Kentucky,
labor has been allowed to organize and press its demands on business
with relatively few impediments, and the rights of business and labor
have been placed on an equal level. The small amount of labor legis-
lation that has been enacted is little more than a codification of the
common law.151 However, in meeting new situations, the common law
has not always been entirely adequate, and the interests of the public
today may require that labor disputes be regulated to a greater degree
to prevent disruption in the economic life of the state as much as
possible. Although the courts may be expected to exercise increased
powers of regulation derived from growing policy considerations, the
legislature should play a much greater role in labor relations than it
has previously. In the words of Brandeis:
Because I have come to the conclusion that the common
law of a State and a statute of the United States declare the right of
industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justifi-
cation of self-interest, I do not wish to be understood as attaching any
constitutional or moral sanction to that right. All rights are derived
from the purposes of the society in which they exist; above all rights
rises duty to the community. The conditions developed in industry
may be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle
without danger to the community. But it is not for judges to de-
termine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set
the limits of permissible contest and to declare the duties which the
new situation demands. This is the function of the legislature which,
while limiting individual and group rights of aggression and defense,
may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of
trial by combat.
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149 Food Basket v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 29 Labor
Cases, par. 69,561 (Cir. Ct., Jefferson Co., Ky. 1955).
150 Food Basket v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 293
S.W. 2d 861 (Ky. 1956).
151 Johnson, supra note 77 at 65.
152 Duplex Co. v. Deering, supra note 22 at 488.
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Today, industrialization is taking place at the fastest rate in the history
of the state. If the state does not in fact need a comprehensive labor
relations statute, it is at least the duty of the legislature to make a
thorough study of the law governing labor disputes in Kentucky and
demonstrate that fact.
lames Park, Jr.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
After this note reached the printer's, the Supreme Court decided the case of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.. ........ U.S ......... , 77 S.Ct.
1166 (1957). This decision constitutes the latest statement by the Supreme Court
on the relation of picketing and the freedom of speech.
THE BROWN DECISIONS AND THE ADVISORY OPINION
According to a recent survey' made by the State Board of Educa-
tion, integration in Kentucky is proceeding in an orderly and reason-
able manner, indicating that there has been a good faith implementa-
tion of those constitutional principles set forth in the Brown decisions.
2
The results of the survey show that integration has begun or a plan
of integration has been adopted in 108 of the 177 school districts
which contain Negroes of school age.3 These 108 districts contain
about 75 percent of the Negro population. Complete integration has
been effected in 18 to 20 percent of these districts.4 The report further
states,
As seen from the following tabulation of all local school
districts, there still remain about 69 districts with about 25 percent
of the Negro population that have taken no steps toward complying
with the decision. No doubt many of these districts had once thought
of following the informal'plan of integration when Negro pupils ap-
plied for entrance in formerly all white schools. This is not legal
procedure according to an opinion of the Attorney General. At the
close of the school year, two school terms will have passed since the
final decision and these school districts should proceed immediately
to move toward the adoption of a plan. In some districts this plan
may not be more than a simple order of the board of education while
in others it may require much study and preparation before the plan
is finally adopted by the board. The important thing to do now is to
take steps and proceed in good faith toward the building of a total
school service for all people of the district.5
Report on Integration, School Year 1956-57, published by the Department
of Education, Frankfort, Kentucky.2 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), designated herein as
the Brown decision; Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), desig-
nated herein as the Brown decree.
3 Supra note 1 at page 2.
4 Id. at page 2.
I Id. at page 8.
